In response to a new European Union law, AI platforms are implementing new schemes for watermarking the content they generate. Anthropic recently disclosed its future Claude models will use SynthID-Text, an approach Google created and released as open source. It uses a secret key that subtly changes the process a model uses for choosing the next word in a sentence.

New research shows that SynthID-Text can change not just word selection but also the tools a model invokes and the chances it will adhere to or disregard safety guardrails it has been trained to follow. The threat can become greater in the face of an adversarial prompt, in which an attacker attempts to cause a model to carry out a harmful action, such as revealing a password or other sensitive information.

Instructions that normally wouldn’t be followed will, in some cases, be performed once the watermarking is deployed. The finding underscores the need for developers to thoroughly test how their LLMs and agents behave when watermarking is in place. Andrea Siposova, an AI security researcher at Lasso Security, told Ars that watermarking is made to not be perceptible to a reader, but it can cause tradeoffs and show up somewhere.

Watermarking works by embedding a signal that allows output to be identified as AI generated, something known as provenance. SynthID takes the normal sampling process and adds a random seed generator, sampling algorithm, and scoring function to it. Instead of the process using an arbitrary random number generator for next-word selection, the watermarking uses a secret key.

A key feature of SynthID is something known as tournament sampling. Similar to a sports game, SynthID evaluates large numbers of next-word token candidates. It uses a secret key to assign them probability scores. A pair of tokens competes in a round. The one with the higher hidden score wins and advances to the next round.

Siposova tested the “non-distortionary” configuration of SynthID-Text through Hugging Face’s unmodified SynthIDTextWatermarkLogitsProcessor. She fed harmful prompts into six open-weight models and compared the responses when the watermarking was used and when it wasn’t. The experiment revealed that the watermarking changed responses to harmful requests, particularly when they were made using prompt-injection techniques.

The changes have important safety consequences because they influence not only the LLM responses but also subsequent actions of AI agents relying on the model. At the model level, this can change safety behavior, including whether the model refuses a harmful request and whether that refusal holds under prompt injection.

The effect of changing a key on model behavior was also studied. Each point represents one key, and points to the right of zero show increased harmful compliance compared with no watermarking; points to the left show reduced compliance. The research has limitations, as it doesn’t test how Claude model responses change under the watermarking, but the results show that at least some forms of the watermarking approach may affect model and agent safety.

This article was written with the assistance of AI.
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