OpenAI chief Sam Altman, DeepMind founder Demis Hassabis, Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, Microsoft AI co‑founder Mustafa Suleyman and a host of other AI leaders sent a joint letter to members of Congress on June 3, 2026. The letter, organized by the nonpartisan Institute for Progress and the right‑leaning Foundation for American Innovation, asks lawmakers to enact laws that require all U.S. providers of synthetic DNA and RNA to screen both customers and the sequences they order.
The signatories point to a “real possibility” that the rapid pace of AI development will erode the knowledge barriers that have historically prevented malicious actors from building biological weapons. Since the first successful synthesis of DNA in the 1950s, the process has become automated and cheap. Dozens of companies worldwide now offer custom gene synthesis services for research, drug development and diagnostics. While many firms restrict sales to qualified researchers and institutions, not all vet customers or the genetic orders they receive.
In 2017, Canadian scientists used $100,000 of mail‑order DNA to resurrect the extinct horsepox virus, sparking alarm that the same approach could be used to recreate smallpox. Since then, the cost of gene synthesis has continued to fall, and AI tools now enable rapid design of novel toxins and pathogens. A large‑language model can suggest DNA sequences that evade existing screening software, according to a 2023 Microsoft study that demonstrated AI‑generated proteins slipping past commercial filters.
“AI tools enable a user to very quickly identify where to turn to order sequences that will not be subject to screening,” said Stanford microbiologist David Relman, a co‑signer of the letter. “If prompted appropriately, they can also tell you how to change the nature of your order, so that even those that are screening may be much less able to detect what it is you’re trying to make.”
The letter also cites the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, formed in 2009, which has promoted voluntary screening practices among its members, including Twist Bioscience and Ansa Biotechnologies. Twist’s policy chief James Diggans stressed that companies capable of synthesizing DNA must understand what they are making and for whom. He noted that the company has long supported formal rules to ensure responsible use.
Federal guidelines introduced during the Biden administration already require researchers and companies receiving federal funds to order synthetic genes from screened providers. Building on that framework, the signers back a bipartisan Senate bill introduced earlier this year that would make screening mandatory for all gene‑synthesis firms operating in the United States.
Critics caution that screening alone will not solve the problem. Relman warned that “given that the screening may fail in some cases, we must then have other points of control.” Geoff Ralston, former Y Combinator president and Safe AI Fund partner, echoed the sentiment, urging AI labs that host biology models to conduct their own user screening. “It should be very difficult, if not impossible, to ask a model to help you do something imminently dangerous,” he wrote.
The signatories argue that a layered approach—mandatory screening, robust oversight of AI tools, and additional control points—offers the best defense against the emergence of AI‑designed bioweapons. They stress that failure to act could enable a malicious actor to trigger a global pandemic, cause mass casualties, or create widespread panic and economic disruption.
Congress now faces pressure from a coalition of AI executives, biotech experts and national‑security officials to move quickly. The letter’s authors hope that swift legislative action will keep the “knowledge barriers” that have protected public health intact, even as AI and gene‑synthesis technologies continue to advance.
This article was written with the assistance of AI.
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